Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 82
Issue 1 Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure
11-1-2006

Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention:
Another View
David L. Shapiro

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 59 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol82/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 2

HABEAS CORPUS, SUSPENSION, AND DETENTION:
ANOTHER VIEW
David L. Shapiro*
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."'
INTRODUCTION

The Suspension Clause, as the quoted language is generally described, is as straightforward as an English sentence can be. And to
those familiar with the Great Writ,2 its meaning, at least at first reading, does not seem obscure.
Yet few clauses in the Constitution have proved so elusive. Scholars have debated a remarkable range of questions about its meaning
ever since its inclusion in the text submitted to the states for ratifica@
2006 David L. Shapiro. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard University. My
deepest thanks to Bruce Hay, Dan Meltzer, and Amanda Tyler for their insightful
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
2 The writ of habeas corpus has many varieties and purposes, all involving the
literal (or, later on, figurative) production of a detainee before the court, and some
forms of the writ have developed more recently than others. For the range and forms
of its current use, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). For informative

histories of the evolution of the writ, see, for example, WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CoRPus (1980); ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE
RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Albany, W.C. Little
& Co. 1858); ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960).
The most significant form of the writ, and the one most relevant to the meaning
and application of the Suspension Clause, has been known before and since adoption
of the Constitution as the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the form designed to
test the lawfulness of the petitioner's detention. It is the form sometimes referred to
as "The Great Writ."
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tion, and some of the most difficult of these have yet to be resolved by
the Court that regards itself as the final arbiter of constitutional disputes. 3 Any list of the most significant of these questions would surely
include:
0 Does the Clause impose on the federal government not only an
explicit prohibition (subject to explicit exceptions), but also an implicit obligation?
" If it does, what is the nature of the obligation?
" Which branch or branches of the federal government have au4
thority to suspend the writ?

What constitutes a "suspen[sion]" of the writ?
" Is the decision by an authorized branch of the government to
suspend the writ subject to judicial review, and if so, under what
standard?
e What are the consequences of a valid suspension of the writ? In
particular, does a suspension simply render unavailable a particular
remedy, or does it modify or abrogate any otherwise existing rights?
Given the historical and present value of the writ as a safeguard of
individual liberty, every one of these questions can have profound importance, especially in a time of national crisis, and each will be addressed, at least briefly, in this Article. Indeed, to separate out any
one for completely independent consideration would challenge even
the most artful of lawyers-a clan that, it is said, possesses the special
skill of separating the inseparable.
But my principal focus will be on the last question-the consequences of a valid suspension. This question, in itself, raises challenging issues about the nature of law and the relation between rights and
remedies-issues that intrigue legal theorists at any time but that, at
"

3

The debate about the relative roles of the three branches of the federal govern-

ment in interpreting the Constitution is a continuing one. See RICHARD H.

FALLON,

JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAIRO, HART AND WECHSIFR's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 88-92 (4th ed. 1996). (Space limitations compelled

the unfortunate omission of this material in the next edition.)

But there is little

doubt that the Court today views its role-limited only by the doctrines ofjurisdiction
and justiciability-as that of final arbiter of the meaning and application of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974); cf. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (rejecting state officials' claim that they had no enforceable duty to comply with federal court orders resting on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution).
4 Although lawyers and judges generally speak of suspension of the writ, the text
actually refers to suspension of"Iitlhe Privilege of the Writ." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.
2. There may be a difference between the two phrases, but for convenience, the
shorter form will be used here.
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of law by criminal and civil
this writing, may also affect the practice
and the fates of prisoners.
rights lawyers, the decisions of judges,
is a recent article by
My point of departure, in some respects,
argues that a valid suspension
Professor Trevor Morrison in which he
the power to grant habeas
serves only to withdraw from the courts
or abrogate any underlying constitutional
corpus but does not modify
5
that while such a result is not im(or other legal) right. My view is
either the essence of the Great
plausible, it cannot be squared with
of the Suspension Clause.
Writ or with a proper understanding
those who would resist
This conclusion may jar, or even offend,
that would appear to threaten
any interpretation of the Constitution
at least some of these critics
basic liberties. But I hope to convince
to the needs of government in
that the interpretation I advocate is fair
as a limited authorization of the
crisis and-if properly understood
times of urgent need-is at the
exercise of extraordinary power in
of individuals as such a crisis
same time as protective of the rights
of Morrison's position could
reasonably permits. Indeed, adoption
the objective envisioned by the
nullify, or at least severely undermine,
granting of authority to suspend.
I.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

is worthy of at
Each of the questions posed in the Introduction
of
consideration
some
least brief discussion in this Article. Moreover,
major
the
an understanding of
each is proper, if not necessary, to
question under consideration here.
A.

The Question of Obligation

law writ referred to in the
Habeas corpus is the only common
only as a conditional prohibiConstitution, and the reference appears
In the absence of a specific
tion on the exercise of federal authority.
or any other clause of the
grant of authority, then, can this Clause,
existence of authority to grant
Constitution, be read to mandate the
simply that the federal governthe writ? Or does the Clause mean
91
Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?,
Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas
of the
discussions
scholarly
other
(2006). Among the many
CORNELL L. REv. 411, 415
on the central issue in
the one that touches most closely
perhaps
Clause,
Suspension
Global War on
Limits of HabeasJurisdiction and the
this essay is James E. Pfander, The
a closely reof
discussion
And for insightful
Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (2006).
A TransacDimensions:
Two
in
The Constitution
lated problem, see Eugene Kontorovich,
Eugene
(2005);
1135
REv.
L.
VA.
91
Remedies,
tion Cost Analysis of Constitutional
56
Detentions,
Mass
Rights: The Case of
Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional
Rules].
[hereinafter Kontorovich, Liability
STAN. L. REv. 755 (2004)
5
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from denying the abilment is barred (with the specified exceptions) States that has been
United
ity to grant the writ to any court in the
or positive law? If the latter,
given that authority either by common
judiciaries from federal intruperhaps the Clause simply protects state
to entertain and to grant a
sion on whatever power they may have
6
habeas petition.
be found not only in the lanTextual support for this view may
in the list of delegated
guage of the Clause but in its location-not prohibitions in Section
in a list of
8
powers in Section 8 of Article I, but
as a "privilege," not a right. And
to
9.7 Moreover, the writ is referred
view may be garnered from the
historical support for the narrower
an affirmative guarantee of the
facts that an earlier draft did contain
some contemporary observers
availability of the writ, and that at least
the final version submitted for
apparently thought or assumed that
9
ratification contained no such guarantee.
during the Convention and
But the contemporary history, both
and to leave the present-day
after, turns out to be more ambiguous,
- u ncertain ' I
originalist
dyed-in-the-wool
a
even
observer-perhaps
term
words "habeas corpus"-a
- could
As for the text, the drafters' use of the
Blackstone'
a heavy diet of
familiar to all lawyers schooled on
126-80) to
an entire chapter (chapter 3, pages
6 William Duker devotes most of
Congressional
restrict
to
Clause was intended "only
an argument that the Suspension
2, at 126; see
federal prisoners." DUKER, supra note
for
habeas
power to suspend state
that
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending
also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337
of,
existence
any content to, or even the
the Suspension Clause does not guarantee
whatever
temporarily
of Congress to withhold
the writ; rather it limits only the ability
A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for ConvictsRex
statute);
by
it has already authorized
(noting conCAL. L. REv. 335, 342 (1952)
40
ConstitutionalRight or Legislative Grace?,
Dallin
Clause);
form of the text of the Suspension
temporary criticism of the negative
7 6 18 6 5 , 32 U. CI. L. REV. 243, 248-49
H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-17
Clause was drafted, the question
Suspension
the
time
the
at
that
(1965) (suggesting
matter of
the privilege of the writ was not a
whether the Constitution guaranteed
state).
was then available in every
concern, perhaps because the writ
2.
cl.
9,
§
I,
art.
7 U.S. CONST.
8 Id.
Corpus: Early American Origins and Develop9 See Milton Cantor, The Writ of Habeas
W. Levy eds.,
55, 75 (Harold M. Hyman & Leonard
ment, in FREEDOM AND REFORm
of the
availability
the
guaranteed
the Clause
1967) (noting uncertainty about whether
6, at
note
at common law); Collings, supra
writ or simply assumed its existence
340-41.
J.
see RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL
10 For further discussion and references,
COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
MELTZER & DAVID L. SH-APIRO,
& WECHSLER].
HART
[hereinafter
ed. 2003)
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1289-93 (5th
principal

referrecognized as perhaps the
11 Blackstone, whose work is generally
the
in
later
and
colonies
the
practicing in
ence and source of learning for lawyers
refers
Constitution,
the
of
adoption
the
following
states in the years leading up to and
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well be taken as an implicit recognition that this well-known and
highly respected writ would of course exist unless the specified conditions of crisis warranted its suspension. And since at the time there
were states whose own constitutions did not guarantee the writ's availability,' 2 that assumption could be understood as carrying with it a
federal guarantee. (The question was mooted, at least in part, by the
specific grant of authority to issue the writ in one of the earliest federal statutes-the Judiciary Act of 1789.1")
Like many others, I believe that the broader view-that the writ is
in fact guaranteed by implication in the Suspension Clause-is an appropriate (and, for me, the most plausible) reading of Chief Justice
Marshall's somewhat cryptic discussion in Ex parte Bollman.14 While
stating that the authority of the federal courts to grant the writ is both
created and defined by the relevant Act of Congress, he also makes it
to the writ generally as "the most celebrated writ in the English law." WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES * 129. He also refers to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as "the
great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Id. at *131. He goes
on to extol the significance of the writ in maintaining "the glory of the English law,"
id. at *133, by requiring the custodian to express "upon every commitment the reason
for which it is made, that the court, upon a habeas corpus, may examine into its validity," id. at * 134.
12 Indeed, although the writ was known and available in at least some form in
every original state, see DUKER, supra note 2, at 116, a significant majority of those
states did not guarantee the availability of the writ in their own constitutions, see Oaks,
supra note 6, at 247.
13 Section 14 of the judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, provided that
the courts of the United States
shall have power to issue writs of scirefacias, habeas corpus ... and all other
writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for, the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law. And ... either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as
judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.
In Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), the Court read these provisions
as authorizing not only issuance of the writ as auxiliary to jurisdiction already conferred but also as authorizing an independent action in habeas corpus; the power
expressly conferred on individual justices and judges by the second quoted sentence
was held to be implicitly vested in the courts. Id. at 95-96; see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 10, at 1286.
14 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). The issue discussed in this paragraph of text
divided the Court in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 291-92 (2001). After concluding, in
dictum, that the Suspension Clause at a minimum protected the writ as it existed in
1789, the majority viewed the language of the Court in Bollman as consistent with this
protection. See id. at 304 n.24. justice Scalia, speaking for himself and two other
Justices on this point, argued that under Bollman, the Suspension Clause conferred no
inherent power to grant the writ. See id. at 339-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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clear that, in his (the Court's) view, the Suspension Clause imposed
on Congress an obligation to confer habeas corpus jurisdiction on the
judiciary.15 These two notions are not inconsistent: after all, the Constitution explicitly mandates the existence of a Supreme Court, but it
is difficult to see how a resistant Congress could have been compelled
16 And at
by some external authority to create it.
the same time, Marshall's view does not have to be understood to require the creation of
a judicial system capable of entertaining petitions for the writ, for
7
Congress could surely have vested that power in the state courts.1

Another argument for the existence of an affirmative guarantee:
the habeas corpus remedy is essential to the full realization of certain
other guarantees, most particularly that of due process of law in the
Fifth Amendment. True, the Bill of Rights followed ratification, but
there was a widespread understanding that it would follow, and the
development of the writ in England was closely linked with the need
to make effective the guarantees of the Magna Carta, especially that of
due process of law. 18 Indeed, the notion that a remedy of this kind is
15 Bolman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95. Chief Justice Marshall's precise language,
admittedly subject to a range of interpretations, was:
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction [the Suspension
Clause], they [Congress] must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation
of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege
should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the
privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be
enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all courts, the
power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.
Id.
16 Of course, the obligation here could have been regarded as self-executing, and
some day that issue may have to be squarely faced. But so far, it has not.
17 The word "surely" is often used, as here, to indicate that the author's certainty
is not universally shared. Indeed, a number of Supreme Court decisions, including
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859), and Tarb/e's Case, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1872), can be read as holding that the states are constitutionally
precluded from granting a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to a petitioner held
in federal custody. But they can also be read as simply asserting (implied) exclusive
federal jurisdiction to grant such a writ, and if read more broadly, may well run afoul
of basic concepts of the role of the state courts in enforcing federal, and especially
constitutional, rights. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 437-39.
18 As noted by Walker, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries:
[T] he Charter [Magna Carta] and the writ of habeas corpus became inextricably intertwined ....In the battle against royal despotism the Charter was
adduced as evidence of the illegality of arbitrary executive commitments and
the writ of habeas corpus was seized upon as the most likely instrument by
which such commitments could be subjected to due process. The result was
the clear emergence of the Charter as the touchstone of the subject's liberty
and the habeas corpus as the instrumental guarantee of his right.
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essential to the realization of the due process rights of those in custody might well support the conclusion that, had there been no Suspension Clause, such a remedy would still be implicitly mandated by
the Constitution.
At any rate, I happily join the judges and commentators who draw
on text, history, context, and policy to conclude that our Federal Constitution provides more than a limitation on federal power to suspend
the writ-that it embodies a guarantee of its availability in the absence
of the conditions allowing that limitation to be put into effect.' 9 Indeed, as I will try to explain later, this conclusion lends support to my
view of the effect of a valid suspension on the scope of underlying
individual rights.
B.

The Nature of the Obligation

Not surprisingly, crossing one threshold brings us to anotherone I describe here as the nature of the obligation that is imposed.
Once again, the text is far from definitive, since it refers to "Habeas
20
Corpus" but makes no effort to define the term.

At the very least, the term appears to carry with it whatever comprised the general understanding of the writ at the time the Suspension Clause was adopted. And that understanding was informed by
the writings of Blackstone, 2 1 use of the writ in this country, 22 and
whatever knowledge may have existed of the many English cases ex23
ploring the scope of the writ over the preceding centuries.

supra note 2, at 88; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *133-34 (linking
the guarantees of Magna Carta and the role of the writ of habeas corpus).
19 Professor Freedman reached a similar conclusion (though differently phrased)
after examination of the records of the Constitutional Convention and of the ratification debates: "[The records suggest] that all parties read it [the Suspension Clause] as
protecting broadly against Congressional interference with the power that federal and
state courts were each assumed to possess: to order the release on habeas corpus of
both federal and state prisoners." Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BuFF. L. RE'. 451, 468 (1996).
20 US. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
21 See supra note 11.
22 See generally DuKER, supra note 2, at 95-116 (describing the extension of the
WALKER,

writ in the British colonies in North America).

23

See generally William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A

Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 983 (1978) (arguing that the "Great Writ"
developed over time into an instrument protecting personal liberty, but began as a
means of facilitating a monarchical judicial process).
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as even Blackstone acknowledged
One major difficulty is that,
has not been one of either transthe story of the writ's development
And as American courts often
parency or unimpeded progress.
been marked by a consideranoted, the history of the writ has always
25 Moreover, the writ has served different
ble degree of discretion.
it has been a device for assertpurposes at different times. Sometimes,
26
has
competing court. Sometimes it
ing jurisdictional primacy over a
concourts
which the common-law
been the principal technique by
sometimes it has given way before
and
tested the power of the Crown
exclusive authority to determine the
the insistence of the executive on
27 Indeed, on several occabasis, duration, and nature of detention.
2 s or by statute, 2 9 to reresolution
sions, Parliament saw fit, either by
of the importance of the writ in
mind the courts and the Crown
duly authorized by existing law.
confining detentions to occasions
corpus ad subjiciendum), howThe core of the Great Writ (habeas
this period as the vehicle
ever, can fairly be summarized throughout
a
action had on occasion been required-as
24 Blackstone noted that legislative
supra
BLACKSTONE,
courts.
English
by some
result of various "evasions" and "abuses"
past"
not only to the writ's "dark and hazy
referred
Cantor
And
"134-35.
at
note 11,
comand
usage,
through "trial-and-error
and its development in the United Kingdom
of
denial
frequent
the
to
also
note 9, at 58, but
promise arrangements," Cantor, supra
arbiof
exercise
the
curb
to
sought
habeas was
relief in the American colonies when
that by the late eighteenth century,
concludes
he
But
60-73.
at
id.
trary power,
of colonial thought, much like
interstices
the
in
"habeas corpus was deeply embedded
the common law itself." Id. at 73.
241, 251
180 (1906); Ex parteRoyall, 117 U.S.
25 E.g., In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178,
(1880).
375
(1886); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
26

DUKER, supra note 2, at 27-33.

execthe role of habeas corpus in delineating
27 For an informative discussion of
40-48.
at
id.,
and seventeenth centuries, see
utive authority during the sixteenth
note
1, c. 1 (Eng.), noted in WALKER, supra
28 The Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car.
outset.
the
at
least
at
goal,
and fell short of its
2, at 66-70, was essentially supplicatory,
Though frequently referred to by historians
(Eng.).
2
c.
2,
29 Act of 1679, 31 Car.
e.g.,
statutes in the annals of English law, see,
as one of the most famous and important
no principle
introduced
Act
the
that
notes
DUKER, supra note 2, at 52, Henry Hallam
HISTORY OF ENHALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
and conferred no new rights, HENRY
remedy several
to
sought
it
9th ed. 1905). Rather
CLAND 430-31 (William Smith ed.,
to grant the
judges
individual
by authorizing
abuses that had developed, for example,
(to
the geographical reach of the writ
writ during the vacation and by extending
431-32.
at
Id.
outside the court's jurisdiction).
thwart efforts to move the prisoner
the warinto the validity of facts alleged in
inquire
to
courts
But it did not empower
(requiring that if
guarantees
limited
only
rant ordering the detention, and extended
a right to
a certain period, the petitioner had
an indictment was not filed within
a signifiTo
432.
at
Id.
for treason or felony.
release on bail) in cases of commitment
back
thrown
were
Act,
1679
the
of
enactment
cant extent, then, petitioners, even after
law. Id.
common
at
exist,
to
continued
and
on the habeas remedy as it had existed,
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writ directed to the
for determining the lawfulness of confinement-a a statement of the
with
custodian to produce the prisoner, together
n 3. ° And if the statement did not satisfy the court
cause of his detentio
was discharge (or release
of the lawfulness of the custody, the remedy
appropriate)."
32
on the giving of surety, if that was
to raise a host of questions.
turn,
in
is,
core
the
But to state
the court to which the prisoner apWhat was the territorial reach of
was not pursuant to the order of
plied for relief? When the detention
executive (often the Crown),
a court but solely on command of the
executive did not have to supply
were there situations in which the
statement that the prisoner was
any explanation beyond the vaguest
And when a more informdetained pursuant to executive command?
extent could the court entertaining
ative reason was required, to what
of the reason given, especially
the petition inquire into the validity
As to detentions pursuant to judicial
when it raised a question of fact?
power was the character of the
order, how relevant to the court's
(e.g., was it "inferior" in the
court that issued the detention order
a
jurisdiction, it was not necessarily
sense that unlike courts of general
extended only to limited categories
court of record and its authority
scope of the writ when the
of cases)? And what was the appropriate
a
a charge of wrongdoing but on
detention was not based solely on
question in that context whether
trial and conviction? Was the only
to try33the case, and if so, how
the convicting court had "jurisdiction"
term to be defined?
was this chameleon-like
10, at 1284.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note
Id. at 1284-85.
the following
in this paragraph are explored in
32 Many of the questions raised
supra note 2;
HURD,
29;
note
supra
2; HALLAm,
historical studies: DUKER, supra note
For further discussupra note 9; Oaks, supra note 6.
WALKER, supra note 2; Cantor,
The Story
questions, see, for example, EdwardJenks,
sion and debate of some of these
the High
in
History
Legal
64 (1902); Dallin H. Oaks,
of the Habeas Corpus, 18 LAw Q. Rv.
Demodeling
Woolhandler,
Ann
L. REv. 451 (1966);
Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH.
(1993).
575
REV.
L.
STAN.
Habeas, 45
show that the inby judges and commentators to
33 A case sometimes relied on
is Bushel's
stop at the question of "jurisdiction"
quiry on a habeas petition did not
has been
case
famous
(use of the writ in this
Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670)
a verdict
in
bringing
for
could not be imprisoned
Case
regarded as establishing that jurors
Bushell's
noted,
has
scholar
one
as
But
an
believed by the court to be unacceptable).
of
but
not of a court of general jurisdiction
involved an attack on the judgment
DUKER,
See
offenses).
try
to
general jurisdiction
"inferior" court (i.e., one not having
were
on a different footing when their actions
stood
courts
Such
supranote 2, at 227.
supra note
Oaks,
226-27;
at
Id.
court.
a "superior"
challenged by a habeas petition in
have been
factors relating to Bushell's Case that
special
other
five
(noting
32, at 462-67
on it).
overlooked by those seeking to rely
30
31
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Given the difficulty of taking a readily perceptible snapshot of the
writ as it existed at the time of ratification, especially in light of the
range of state law understandings then in effect, 34 even a committed
originalist would find the task of defining the exact contours of the
constitutional guarantee a daunting one. But one who is not a strict
originalist must also ask whether, and to what extent, developments
since ratification have affected the scope of the guarantee. These developments include such changes (brought on by constitutional
amendment, statute, and judicial development) as: (1) expansion in
the notion of "custody" entitling a petitioner to seek relief;35 (2) elimination of the need to produce the body of the prisoner in order to
inquire into the lawfulness of custody;3 6 (3) expansion and ultimate
abandonment of the concept of 'jurisdiction" as the key question in
determining the lawfulness of custody pursuant to a judgment of conviction;3 7 (4) expansion of the scope of the remedy, to the point that
an order of release could be conditioned on such matters as failure to
improve the conditions of detention or failure to accord the prisoner
a new trial;3 a and (5) dilution of the distinction among the various

34 See DuER, supra note 2, at 95-116 (noting that by the time of ratification the
writ was recognized in all the states and documenting the range of use and recognition of the writ in the states and the predecessor colonies).
35 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1395-99 (citing additional supporting
authorities). Among the most significant cases are Jones v. Cunningham,371 U.S. 236,
242-43 (1963), which held that one is still in "custody" while on parole, and Carafasv.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968), which held that the petitioner's unconstitutional
release did not moot a case in which the habeas petition had been filed during the
period of the petitioner's imprisonment.
36 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr,
33 COLUM, HuM. RTs. L. REV. 555, 592 (2002).
37 In the view of some, "jurisdiction" was never the definitive test in the federal
courts for the validity of detention, even detention pursuant to ajudgment of conviction. See, e.g., Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas CorpusRelitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 579, 603-63 (1982). In the view of others, 'jurisdiction" was relevant in
certain types of cases, but the definition of the term was gradually enlarged until, in
decisions leading up to and culminating in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), it
became irrelevant, even in the context of a federal collateral attack on a state conviction. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 483-500 (1963). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 10, at 1314-17 (contrasting differing historical views of jurisdiction and habeas

corpus).
38 Indeed, in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 55 (1968), the Court, overruling an
earlier decision, held that a habeas petitioner could challenge the validity of the second of two consecutive sentences while still serving the first.
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types of tribunals or other authorities that had ordered the
detention.3 9
At the same time, recent decades have seen a rolling back of the
scope of protection afforded by the writ, especially (but by no means
exclusively) as it relates to the availability of a federal remedy for state
prisoners. 40 To what extent this erosion may lie within the discretion
of the legislative and judicial branches depends in part on whether
the boundaries of the constitutional guarantee have expanded over
the preceding century and a half.
The Justices of the Supreme Court have had occasion to express
some views on these issues as recently as 2001, in INS v. St. Cyr.4 1 Justice Scalia, for three Justices, argued that the Constitution did not
guarantee any content to, or even the existence of, the writ.4 2 Justice
Stevens, for the majority, took a diametrically opposite position in
what may be only dictum, but is written in the strongest of terms. 43 At
39 The former distinction between "inferior" courts (i.e., courts that had limited
jurisdiction and that might not be courts of record) and courts of general jurisdiction,
discussed, inter alia, by Woolhandler, has ceased to be important, but the distinction
between detention pursuant to court order and detention solely on the basis of executive decision remains significant. Woolhandler, supranote 32, at 589-90; see, e.g., INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961 (1998).
40 The retreat from the extensions of the writ during the Warren Court era focused primarily on its use by state prisoners complaining that their convictions violated their federal constitutional rights. Starting with such decisions as Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976), Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989), the retreat was given further momentum by Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, & 42 U.S.C.),
which contains a number of provisions restricting the writ's availability, perhaps most
notably the section, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000), requiring increased deference to the factual and legal determinations of the state courts. See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1296-1399 (tracing the availability of federal review of
state court convictions from the antebellum era through the passage of the AEDPA in
1996 and its aftermath).
41 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
42 Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 300-01 (majority opinion). One of the questions before the Court was
whether, in imposing restrictions on judicial review in certain statutory amendments
to the immigration laws, Congress had limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
entertain habeas corpus petitions, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, raising legal challenges to
petitioner's detention. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298. The Court held that it had not, and in
doing so, relied on the presumption in favor of judicial review, as well as on the substantial constitutional questions that, in its view, would be presented under the Suspension Clause if habeas corpus relief, as well as adequate alternative remedies, were
unavailable. Id. at 298-314.
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its core (and as "the absolute minimum"), 44 he said, "the Suspension
Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789,' "4 and in the context of
executive detention, where its protection is strongest, it embraces the
legality (i.e., lawfulness, whether grounded in the Constitution or not)
46
of the detention.
To explore the other side of this coin-the question of determining what limitations on the availability of the writ would violate the
constitutional guarantee-requires further elaboration. But there is
an important question that needs to be addressed prior to that elaboration (in Part I.C, below): where does the authority rest to suspend
the writ when and if the conditions for suspension are met?
C.

The Locus of Authority to Suspend the Writ

Assuming, then, some consensus on-or at least willingness to assume for purposes of further discussion-the basic contours of the
constitutional guarantee, a natural follow-up question is whether the
authority to suspend the writ is limited to any branch or branches of
the federal government.
The federal government has (at least) three branches (four, by
some counts), and one of those is the judicial. And an early draft of
47
the Suspension Clause appeared in what became Article 1II. Yet I
have seen no argument that the writ may be suspended by the judicial
branch acting on its own. Is the suggestion wholly implausible?
Perhaps so, since it is hard to imagine a petition being dismissed
because a rebellion or invasion justifies suspension unless the custodian asks for dismissal on that ground. Theoretically, perhaps, one
can imagine a situation in which the executive branch is so (temporarily?) incapacitated that it is unable to respond to a petition. But the
breakdown of civil authority in such a situation would probably be so
complete that a functioning judiciary is difficult to envision. Moreover, the Clause did not remain in the Article establishing the judicial
branch, but ended up in Article I, dealing principally with the authority of the legislative branch.
Realistically, then, the question is whether the authority is vested
in either or both the legislative and executive branches. Though our
history includes very few executive efforts to suspend the writ without
44 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300-01.
45 Id. (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)).
46 Id. at 301 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977)). The Court
relied on a similar statement (also dictum) in Felker. 518 U.S. at 663-64.
47 See 2 TiE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 435 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THlE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
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legislative authorization, 48 the arguments that the power to authorize
suspension is vested exclusively in the legislature are powerful, and,
49
for me, convincing.
First, under the English tradition from which we derived our understanding of the writ, suspension was, at least as a matter of practice,
the exclusive prerogative of Parliament-a prerogative exercised on a
number of occasions. 50 Second, the Suspension Clause, as noted, appears in Article I, the article dealing with the powers of Congress, and
to the extent it contains an explicit authorization, the inference that
the power to authorize belongs to the legislature seems a natural
one.5 1 And finally, though there is no square Supreme Court holding,
several Justices have endorsed the view that the authority to suspend is
48 President Lincoln ordered suspension of the writ during the Civil War (and
prior to legislative authorization of suspension), an action that Chief Justice Taney
held unconstitutional in Ex parte Menyman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 151-53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861)
(No. 9487). (There is debate over whether the petition in Merryman was directed to
Taney in his capacity as a circuit justice or as Chief Justice. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,
15 CARDOZO L. RE\,. 81, 90 n.27 (1993)).
In addition, the writ was suspended (without legislative authorization) by (then

General) Andrew Jackson as commander at New Orleans. See

DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 160 (2003); Morrison, supra note 5, at 428, 429 & n.102. (Also,

President Andrew Johnson reportedly suspended the writ for one of the conspirators
involved in Lincoln's assassination. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT
ONE 165 (1998)). See generally Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution and the War on Terror,74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1475, 1487-88 (2005).
49 See generallyJeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer
from the Arguments SurroundingExparte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11 (2004) (providing perhaps the most exhaustive discussion of this question).
50 Parliament effectively suspended the writ a number of times during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Collings, supra note 6, at 339-40 (listing instances and collecting citations).
51 To be sure, Section 9, the provision of Article I where the Suspension Clause
appears, contains some prohibitions applicable to the Executive (e.g., bans on the
granting of titles of nobility, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, and on the acceptance of any
gift from a foreign state without the consent of Congress, id.). But the wording in
these instances leaves no doubt of their scope. Moreover, these prohibitions do not
contain exceptions authorizing actions in the absence of legislative authorization or
approval.
Also, the first version of the Suspension Clause explicitly stated that the privileges
and benefit of habeas corpus "shall not be suspended by the Legislature except upon
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding

months."

RECORDS Or THE FEDERAL CONWENTION,

supra note 47, at 334 (emphasis

added). But after a later version appeared in the judiciary article, see id. at 341, the
final version came to rest in Article I.
For a fuller discussion of this evolution, see Ekeland, supra note 48, at 1484-86.
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delegated only to Congress. 52 To my knowledge, no Justice has expressed disagreement with that view.
There is at least one question raised by this conclusion, though.
What if, in a clear emergency, Congress cannot act quickly enough?
(Suppose, for example, that it must first be called into session, and
then some member stalls efforts to circumvent the ordinarily cumbersome legislative process.) Should the courts recognize at least a temporary power, residing in the Executive, to deal with such emergency
situations?
Necessity may well demand the existence of such authority, and I
assume that the Executive, in dire circumstances, would in any event
run the risk of eventual rejection of any emergency power. But with
this limited qualification, the historical, textual, and structural argu53
ments for exclusive legislative authority are, in my view, convincing.
D.

When Does a Limitation on the Availability of the Writ Violate
54

the Guarantee?

We have traveled far enough to conclude (or for skeptics-I
hope-to assume) that the Suspension Clause, perhaps coupled with
other provisions, especially the guarantee of due process, imposes an
52 Most notably, Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 151-52.
This view was also expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 101 (1807), and Justice Scalia, whose dissenting opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), noted with approval the general assumption that only
Congress may authorize suspension of the writ, id. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53 See Ekeland, supra note 48, at 1517 (suggesting that this conclusion can be
squared with the argument that an emergency could require immediate executive
action when, say, Congress is not in session on the ground that "[t]he President could
hold a detainee until Congress reconvenes and decides whether habeas corpus should
be suspended"). In any event, I have little doubt that the Executive would act in this
situation, and that Congress would later seek to ratify his action. Note that Congress's
authorization of suspension of the writ, Act of Mar. 3,1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755,
755, followed Lincoln's initial decision to suspend the writ early in the Civil War in
Proclamation No. 1, 13 Stat. 730 (Sept. 24, 1862).
54 Among the issues not explored in this section are (a) whether and to what
extent the guarantee of the writ extends extraterritorially, and (b) whether and to
what extent the guarantee permits distinctions to be drawn between U.S. citizens and
aliens. Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer explore in detail these and related issues.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARv. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2007).
The questions explored by Fallon and Meltzer are especially critical in
considering the validity of restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus to aliens
detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-restrictions imposed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (e)
(West Supp. 2006) (see infra note 69)-and of even broader restrictions on the
availability of the writ to aliens detained as "enemy combatant[s]" that would be
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to make the essence of the
obligation on the federal government
forum, and that only Congress
Great Writ available in some judicial
requiring interim action) can au(in the absence of an emergency
If the conditions warranting susthorize suspension of this guarantee.
what kinds of limitations on the
pension concededly do not exist,
that guarantee?
availability of the writ would violate
I.C, above, is sound, virtually
To begin, if the conclusion in Part
whether or not warranted by invaany suspension of the guarantee,
Constitution unless authorized by
sion or rebellion, would violate the
of the possibility that a limited
5
Congress.5 (I say "virtually" because
if the emergency is so immediate
authority may exist in the Executive
to
before Congress can be expected
that suspension must be allowed
act.)
the writ, and even on some ocOn many occasions, defenders of
argued, or at least suggested,
casions advocates of its expansion, have
run afoul of the constitutional
that to reject their contentions would
(some more persuasive than
guarantee. Such statements, for example
opponents of the legislature's substiothers), have been made by: (1)
writ in cases of post-conviction chaltution of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for the
5 6 (2) the Court itself in holding
lenges by persons in federal custody;
direct review was not necessa57
that an adequate state ground barring
on a state conviction; (3) the
rily a bar to collateral habeas attack
the
had not precluded use of
58 (4)
Court itself in holding that Congress
of certain immigration matters;
writ in its effort to curtail review
that, in view of the fundamental
a scholarly article contending
Amendment, the guarantee manchanges wrought by the Fourteenth
by a prisentertain a habeas petition
59 And on one
dates federal court authority to
of a state court.
oner held pursuant to the judgment
for the Court en route to
speaking
occasion, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
restrict the ability of
a holding that Congress could constitutionally
in federal court, was willing
state prisoners to file successive petitions
press. See, e.g., S.
at the time this Article went to
imposed by several bills pending
3861, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006).
3901, 109th Cong. § 6 (2006); S.
text.
55 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying
219 (1952) (upholding the suffi205,
342 U.S.
56 See United States v. Hayman,
ciency of the statutory procedure).
428-34 (1963).
57 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
by the major314 (2001). For a study relied on
58 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
990-1004.
at
see Neuman, supra note 39,
ity in St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302 n.16,
Constitutional
the Suspension Clause: Is There a
59 See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating
(1994).
888-99
862,
REv.
State Prisoners?,92 MICH. L.
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for
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to "assume, for purposes of decision here, that the . . . Clause . . .
0
refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789."6
Aside from the unremarkable inference that those arguing for a
particular result are prone to invoke the Constitution whenever it is
plausible to do so, what conclusions is one to draw about all this, and
more pointedly, about the proper interpretation of the constitutional
guarantee? Surely, the guarantee is not a one-way ratchet, in which
every advance in the availability of the writ becomes part of the guarantee itself. 6 1 (Indeed, such a possibility might serve as a disincentive
to experimental expansion of the remedy.) At the same time, the
guarantee would be stripped of virtually all meaning if it did not include what might fairly be viewed as the essence of the writ at the time
of ratification, perhaps defined to embrace those clarifications in its
scope that attended its later development.
Of course, such a definition begs the question of distinguishing
between the area of "clarification," or molecular development, and
that of more radical expansion of the traditional uses of the writ. But
to dramatize the point, if in recent years, the courts, with or without
legislative direction, had developed the habeas remedy to the point
that it had become a generally available device for collateral review of
a criminal conviction, whether or not the petitioner is, or ever was, in
custody pursuant to the conviction, surely a legislative decision to roll
back the remedy to situations involving present custody, realistically
defined, would present no Suspension Clause problem.
Some particularization may be useful, even though it leaves open
some difficult issues. In my view, as noted above, the heart of the writ
as it existed in 1789 was its availability to test the lawfulness of detention. 62 In all instances, this extended to a determination of the adequacy of the custodian's return, but "adequacy," for example, might
or might not include the ability to test the accuracy of the statements
in the return, and might or might not include the ability to probe
beyond the competency of the committing authority to order the
60 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996). But he did go on to say, citing
Bollman, that the authority of a federal court to grant the writ must be given by written
law, id. at 664; "that judgments about the proper scope of the writ are 'normally for
Congress to make,'" id.; and that newly enacted statutory restrictions on successive
petitions did not violate the Suspension Clause because they were "well within the
compass of this evolutionary process," id. (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,
323 (1996)).
61 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the view that the
Clause is a "one-way ratchet that enshrines in the Constitution every grant of habeas
jurisdiction").
62 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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commitment. And I have found little if any indication that the custodian was required repeatedly to justify a detention that had already
been unsuccessfully challenged. But there is no doubt that by the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the test of lawfulness was
especially rigorous when the committing authority was not a "superior" court but rather the executive or an "inferior" court (i.e., a court
not necessarily "of record" and not having a broad general jurisdiction
to try offenses) ,63 and particularly when the commitment was not pursuant to a trial and conviction by a "superior" court with competence
to try the offense.

64

Turning to the special features of the American federal system,
one draws little aid from the English experience, but our own history
does cast some light. It suggests that the guarantee does not mandate
the availability of a federal forum for the filing of a petition by one in
state custody, 65 though it may well preclude federal interference with
the availability of the writ in state courts, at least in the absence of an
available federal forum. 6 6 And in the absence of a federal forum, it
may also mandate the availability of a state forum for the bringing of a
petition (on grounds previously unavailable) when the claim of unlawful custody is based on federal law. 6 7 But this last question is made
63 See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 39, at 982-83; Woolhandler, supra note 32, at
589-90 (discussing the status and nature of "inferior" courts); see also Neuman, supra
note 39, at 1020-59 (discussing the use of the writ to test the validity of executive
detentions).
64 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1290 (noting the difference between
cases where the committing authority was a court of general criminal jurisdiction and
those where detention was not authorized by any court).

65 A proviso to § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, stated
that the writ "shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in
custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed
for trial before some court of the same." Specific exceptions to this proviso were
enacted before the Civil War, but expansion of the writ to encompass generally prisoners in state custody did not occur until 1867. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat.
385, 385. But see Steiker, supra note 59, at 888-99 (contending that the effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to make the constitutional privilege of the writ applicable to those in state custody). Even if accepted, this argument may not guarantee a
petitioner access to a federal court. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1292.
66 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The possible conflict between this
proposition and the result in such decisions as Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397
(1872), is discussed supra note 17.
67 The question of a state's obligation to afford some sort of post-conviction process, other than direct review (when direct review was for some reason not an adequate alternative with respect to a particular federal claim), was presented but not
decided in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965). The question was posed in
terms not of the reach of the Suspension Clause, but of the requirements of due
process. Id. But as noted above at supra text accompanying note 18, the habeas rem-
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murkier by the many unresolved issues involving the extent to which
federal law may "commandeer" the state courts in situations where
those courts are not discriminating against federal claims. 68
Finally, precedent supports the common sense proposition that
the substitution of a reasonable alternative remedy for the traditional
writ does not constitute an invalid suspension, though of course the
question whether the available alternative is a sufficient one is not subject to a simple litmus test.69 And an alternative remedy may well include one not available until a later date, especially if the only harm
claimed in the interim is the necessity of undergoing proceedings
70
before a competent tribunal.
edy (or an adequate alternative) and the right of a detainee not to be deprived of
liberty without due process are intertwined.
68 For the possible impact of such "anti-commandeering" decisions as New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), on
the question of the extent to which federal constitutional obligations may be imposed
on state courts, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 451-53.
69 The Supreme Court has frequently recognized the authority of a federal court
to grant a writ of habeas corpus in a particular case but has held that petitioner
should (first, or instead) be required to resort to his remedies on direct review (including direct review by the Supreme Court itself). See, e.g., Tinsley v. Anderson, 171
U.S. 101, 104-05 (1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 239-42 (1895); see also
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214-19 (1952) (holding that the statutory
remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 had not been shown to be an inadequate alternative
to a writ of habeas corpus).
In the important recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2753-54
(2006)-an action involving petitions for mandamus and habeas corpus-the Court
held, on certiorari review, that the Executive had exceeded its authority in establishing a military commission to try the petitioner (an alien in custody at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba) for certain crimes. The Court had to deal at the outset with a statutory
provision, passed while the case was pending before it, providing that "no court...
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ...an application for... habeas corpus
filed by ... an alien detained. . .at Guantanamo Bay." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (e) (West

Supp. 2006). The majority, avoiding any constitutional issues, held as a matter of
statutory construction that the provision did not apply to the case at bar. Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2753-54. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito in dissent,
argued that the provision did apply but concluded that it presented no problem
under the Suspension Clause both because Guantanamo Bay was "outside the sovereign 'territorial jurisdiction' of the United States," id. at 2818, and because the availability of direct federal court review after conviction (under other provisions of the
DTA) constituted an adequate substitute for the writ, id. at 2818-19.
70 See, e.g., Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1914); Ex parte Royall, 117
U.S. 241, 250 (1846). A related question-whether, in the absence of a valid suspension, special conditions may warrant the exercise of a court's discretion to deny the
writ in favor of ex post remedies-is discussed by Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra
note 5.
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In sum, then, I submit that the case for violation of the guarantee
is strongest when the writ (or an acceptable alternative) is unavailable
to challenge the lawfulness of present detention itself, and an adequate opportunity to challenge that detention in ajudicial forum (not
necessarily a federal one) has not previously been afforded. The case
for violation of the guarantee becomes steadily weaker as one moves
away from this core-if, for example, the writ is unavailable when the
petitioner seeks to challenge not the detention itself but rather the
conditions or other related aspects of the detention, when the petitioner has resorted to (or at least was aware of and in a position to
resort to) earlier opportunities to assert such a challenge in a court of
competent jurisdiction, 71 or when the existence of "custody" is
founded not on some form of imprisonment but rather on a significandy less onerous restriction on freedom of movement.
72
E. Judicial Review of a Decision to Suspend

Now suppose that Congress, influenced by what it regards as a
crisis situation, enacts a statute announcing that because of a "rebellion or invasion," the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in certain designated respects. This supposition assumes that
if no claim were or could be made that the textual conditions for suspension existed, the statute would violate the implicit guarantee of the
writ's availability, and that the language of the statute satisfies any
"clear legislative statement" rule 7 3-a rule that, in my view, should be
a requirement for such a significant step.
Judges and commentators have suggested, often with little or no
explanation, that such a legislative determination is not in any way
subject to judicial review. 74 Probably the strongest justification would
71 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225
U.S. 420, 430 (1912).
72 Much of what follows in this brief section is drawn from an excellent article by
Professor Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 ST.N L. REv.
(forthcoming Nov. 2006).
73 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996) (calling it a rule that
since the "Eleventh Amendment and the broader principles that it reflects" play an
important constitutional role, "Congress's intent to abrogate [states' sovereign immunity] must be obvious from a 'clear legislative statement"' (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 504 U.S. 775, 786 (1991))).
74 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 577-78 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 594 n.4 (Thomas,J., dissenting); Ex pareMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144,151-52 (C.C.D.
Md. 1861) (No. 9487) ("'It would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus, in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge
whether the exigency had arisen must exclusively belong to that body."' (quoting 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEf.S

§ 1336
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rest on the view that such a judgment is so political in nature, and so
related to the war power and even to the country's very survival, that
judicial supervision of Congress's determination would be wholly out
75
of order.
This justification has considerable force, and in circumstances of
perceived crisis, may well carry the day. But the Supreme Court has
never squarely ruled on the issue. And at least one scholar has explored the issue in depth, concluding that some form of judicial supervision is appropriate. 76 I will not undertake to rehearse her
arguments in detail here, but only to note a few points. First, some
aspects affecting the authority to suspend are undoubtedly subject to
judicial review, for example, whether or not that power is vested exclusively in the legislative branch, 77 whether the branch with authority to
suspend has in fact exercised that authority, 78 and whether the terms
79
of a suspension include the case at bar.
Second, unlike some matters that have been held, or at least
forcefully argued, to lie beyond the scope of judicial review, the issue
is not one that relates solely to a question of the internal operations of
(Boston, Little Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1858))); ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,
101 (1807); 3 STORY, supra, § 1342. The language used in some of these referencesabout an authority that is vested exclusively in the legislature-may have been intended to say only that the suspension power was not vested in the Executive, and
thus may not have been addressed to the question of judicial review.
75 This argument would bring the issue within the scope of the political question
doctrine. For a survey and analysis of this doctrine, see HART & WECHSLER, supranote
10, at 244-67.
76 See Tyler, supra note 72.
77 See Menyman, 17 F. Cas. at 152.
78 As noted in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 & nn.10-11 (2001), this issue is a
strong candidate for a "clear statement" rule of the kind often imposed by the Court,
especially when important constitutional interests are at stake. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979).
Significantly, in the recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006), no Justice on the Court suggested that the provision of a 2005 statute that
withdrew habeas corpus jurisdiction for aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay constituted an effort by Congress to exercise its power under the Suspension Clause. The
majority held that the withdrawal ofjurisdiction did not apply to the case at bar, id. at
2762-69, and the dissenters argued that the provision presented "no suspension problem" for reasons stated supra note 69, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2818 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
79 The leading example of such review is the famous decision in Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), which is discussed more fully below, see infra text accompanying notes 95-100. See also Ekeland, supra note 48, at 1495-96, 1509; id. at 1496
(noting that the Court in Milligan found that "'suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself" (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. at

130-31)).
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the legislative branch or the processes of enacting a bill or constitutional amendment into law.8 0 Nor does it involve the kind of action
that may fall within the courts' discretion not to adjudicate because it
affects all equally and rather abstractly.A' Rather, it necessarily and
specifically affects those particular individuals whose access to the writ
is withdrawn.
Third, nothing in the text of the Constitution manifests a "demonstrable constitutional commitment" of all aspects of the decision
to the legislative branch, immune from judicial oversight.8 2 Indeed,
the text indicates a possible difference between the relatively straightforward question whether there is a state of "Rebellion or Invasion"
and the question whether under such circumstances, the public safety
"may" require suspension. s In other words, the text suggests that the
existence of the predicate for suspension is not a matter committed to
legislative discretion, but that there is broad, perhaps unreviewable
discretion to determine whether, if that predicate is present, the pub84
lic safety requires suspension.
Fourth, the courts may well have authority to determine whether
an enactment authorizing suspension involves an invidious classifica80 On the Court's reluctance to get involved in questions involving the amending
process, see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435-56 (1939) and id. at 459, 469-70
(Black, J., concurring). For a decision holding that the Constitution leaves to Congress the determination of how to authenticate that a bill has been passed, see Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671-73 (1892). And for a decision in which the Justices disagreed
on whether and to what extent the question of compliance with the Origination
Clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 7, cl. I (requiring revenue bills to originate in the
House of Representatives), is subject to judicial review, see United States v. MunozPores, 495 U.S. 385, 401 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 408 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
81 Consider, for example, the Court's treatment of the issue of standing to sue in
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974), and the discussion of that
case in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21-23 (1998).
82 The phrase "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" was quoted
and used in this context in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993), which held
nonjusticiable, for this and other reasons, a claim that the Senate had failed to comply
with the requirements of the Impeachment Clause, art. 1, § 3, cl. 6. Nixon, 506 U.S. at
237-38.
83 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cI. 2.
84 Even if the question of suspension vel non in the face of an acknowledged
rebellion or invasion is one vested entirely in the discretion of Congress, there may be
limits on the extent of that discretion on such issues as the scope and duration of the
suspension. Thus the very word "suspension" suggests limited duration. And a rebellion in a particular locality, such as Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts-an uprising
very much in the mind of the Framers, see Ekeland, supra note 48, at 1483-84 &
nn.63-64-might not warrant a grant of authority to suspend the writ throughout the
country.
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tion (based, for example, on race, ethnicity, or religion) that cannot
be justified on the basis of the particular circumstances warranting the
suspension.8

Fifth, the argument that the matter is beyond the scope of judicial review because it is related to the exercise of the war power is
contradicted by a host of cases in which the validity of actions related
86
to that power have been considered by the courts.
Finally, to conclude that there is some room for review is not to
deny the importance of substantial deference to the legislature's judgment.8 7 It is one thing to reject, for example, a legislative determination (if one were made) that the crossing of the Rio Grande by
Mexicans looking for work is an "invasion" within the meaning of the
Clause, and another to gainsay the judgment of Congress that an invasion has occurred when an intercontinental missile attack is launched
against American territory, even if the missiles landed in the ocean
short of their target. 8 But to uphold the authority of the federal
courts to consider both cases (in an appropriate judicial proceeding)
is to reaffirm the significance ofjudicial review as a basic aspect of our
governmental structure.
If.

T1E EFFECT OF A VALI

SUSPENSION ON UNDERLYING RIGHTS

With this background, let us assume that Congress has made the
judgment that a suspension of the privilege of the writ is warranted by
a state of rebellion or invasion, and that the judgment is embodied in
a statute that would be sustained on judicial review. No one would
doubt that the effect of the suspension is, at a minimum, to require
dismissal of a habeas petition if the return establishes that the particular custody is within the scope of the statute.8 9 But does the statute
also modify or even abrogate any underlying substantive constitutional
85 For analogous discussion of "external" restraints (i.e., restraints external to the
provisions of Article II) on legislative authority to limit the subject matterjurisdiction
of the federal courts, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 334-35.
86 For numerous examples, see Tyler, supra note 72.
87 The considerations relevant to the difficult question of the standard of review
are discussed in detail in Tyler, supra note 72.
88 For an argument favoring a temporary and limited suspension of the writ for
purposes of dealing with the war on terror, see Ekeland, supra note 48, at 1518.
89 Perhaps the explanation lies in the phrasing of the Suspension Clause when it
speaks of "[t] he privilege" of the writ, but in any event, courts and commentators have
assumed that an exercise of the suspension power does not itself bar a petitioner from
seeking habeas corpus and, at a minimum, obtaining a determination of whether his
case falls within the scope of the suspension. See e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall) 2, 130-31 (1866) ("The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas copus
does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course; and on the
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or other legal rights in a case in which it requires dismissal of the
petition? Can one who is or has been a detainee still maintain, for
example, that his detention is (or was) unconstitutional or otherwise
unlawful, and that he has recourse to other remedies, including damages (now or later), declaratory relief, and perhaps even injunctive
relief?
A.

Professor Morrison's Thesis

In what is perhaps the first exhaustive consideration of this question, Professor Trevor Morrison has contended that the answer to the
general question is yes, though he is less clear on precisely what remedies are or should be available to the detainee. 90 But since I disagree
with his basic conclusion, I will try to summarize his arguments, and to
respond to them, before explaining why and to what extent I come
out on the other side.
At the risk of oversimplification, I submit the following abridgement of Morrison's thesis, but I urge those who seek a fuller understanding of his arguments to read his article in full.
Morrison emphasizes what in some respects is his strongest point:
the writ of habeas corpus is itself a procedural remedy, not a substantive right. 9 1 To analogize the civil wrong of breach of contract, the
remedy of specific performance may be unavailable in some instances,
but that does not abrogate the contractual right; rather it limits the
available remedy to (expectancy) damages. 92 So here, Morrison contends, the remedy of the writ is unavailable but underlying rights remain intact and enforceable by other means. 93
Moreover, the distinction is one recognized in the common law
history of the writ and in at least one crucial decision of our own Supreme Court. In England, "[bly themselves, suspension acts did not
insulate the detaining authority from later-imposed liability [in damages] for unlawful arrest and detention. To do that, Parliament typically accompanied suspension acts with acts of indemnity." 94 And in
return made to it the court decides whether the party applying is denied the right of

proceeding any further with it.").
90 See Morrison, supra note 5, at 416.
91 See, e.g., id. at 427.
92 For discussion of this concept in the contracts context, see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) and related commentary.
93 See Morrison, supra note 5, at 437.
94 Id. at 432 (citing DUKER, supra note 2, at 171 n.118; ROBERT J. SHARPE, THF
LAw OF HABEAS Coi, us 95 (2d ed. 1989)). Pfander also notes the availability of other
remedies as alternatives to habeas corpus and cites Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
331, 337 (1806), as an example of a case in which the Supreme Court allowed a suit
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our own jurisprudence, the landmark decision in Ex parte Milligan9 5a decision rendered by a Court unanimous as to the result but divided
96
on this very issue-lends further support to the proposition. In Milligan, Morrison notes, the Court first concluded that the Act of Congress suspending the writ did not in terms apply in Milligan's case,
and then went on to hold (a) that Congress had not authorized Milligan's trial by military tribunal in a jurisdiction where the civil courts
were open and available, and (b) that Congress in any event could not
have done so constitutionally in view of the guarantees that such a
trial would violate. 9 7 Four Justices (who concurred in the result) specifically disagreed on (b), contending that the power to suspend carried with it the power to arrest and to try the prisoner before a
military tribunal. 98 And in the course of making these arguments,
Morrison also notes that the Suspension Clause is, after all, phrased as
a prohibition with exceptions, and thus cannot reasonably be read as
a delegation of authority to Congress to modify or abrogate any substantive rights. 99
In answer to the possible objection that it makes little difference
whether, if the habeas remedy is unavailable, there are any underlying
rights, Morrison notes the possibility of alternative remedies, such as
damages, as well as the independently restraining effect of those underlying rights on executive abuse.' 0 0 And in answer to the possible
objection that these very responses cast doubt on the utility of the
power to suspend, Morrison asserts that suspension serves to avoid the
burden of litigation in cases of lawful detentions, and to limit the consequences to the executive when the detention is unlawful. 01'
for damages in trespass against the officer who took away the plaintiff's goods in order
to enforce a criminal fine imposed by a court-martial that lacked jurisdiction to try
and convict him. See Pfander, supra note 5, at 500 n.13, 515, 525-37. (Note that
habeas was unavailable in this case not because Congress had exercised its authority
to suspend the writ but because the plaintiff was not in custody.)
95 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). In this case, Milligan, in his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenged the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try an American
citizen, living in Indiana, for conspiring to aid the Confederacy. Id. at 79-80.
96 Id. at 140.
97 Morrison, supra note 5, at 431 & n.121 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127).
98 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 136-37 (opinion of Chase, C.J.) The ChiefJustice's separate opinion is not characterized in the official report, except as an opinion, and has
been variously characterized by comentators. In my view, as explained in the text, it is
a concurrence in the judgment, or result, but not in all of the reasoning of the

majority.
99 Morrison, supra note 5, at 431 & n.121.
100 Id. at 434-37.
101 Id. at 437-40. In the course of his discussion, Morrison draws an analogy to
the famous distinction drawn by Calabresi and Melamed between property rules and
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Morrison concludes by urging that perhaps the most important
purpose served by his analysis is to preserve some role for the judiciary
even in times of crisis, and even when Congress has exercised properly
its authority to suspend the writ-a role that is critical to the preserva10 2
tion of our system of separation and allocation of powers.
B.

Response

Each of Morrison's principal historical arguments-that based on
the English experience and that based on Ex parte Milligan-is vulnerable and, in the end, not persuasive. First, although the English experience is admittedly relevant to our understanding of the writ, there is
a critical difference between the context of that experience and our
own. Though Parliament did not operate free from constraints, those
constraints were essentially imposed by custom and not by law. Given
the concept of Parliamentary supremacy, and the unavailability of judicial review of the validity of statutes, the legislature was legally free
to suspend the writ whenever it chose to do so, and if it also wished to
make sure that no other remedy lay for detention pursuant to such a
suspension of the writ (as Morrison acknowledges it routinely did' 0 3 ),
such legislative action also was subject to no legal restraint. Here, as
Morrison and most observers agree, the availability of the writ is constitutionally guaranteed, subject only to narrow and explicit exceptions. (And of course, we also have other constitutional restraints on
the ability of the legislature to abridge certain rights.)
liability rules. Id. at 439 n.150 (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rvv.
1089 (1972)). The authors of that article note that the availability of an injunctive
remedy gives the property owner a right that is legally immunized from interference
(and thus constitutes a "property rule"), Calabresi & Melamed, supra at 1092, while a
damages remedy gives the owner only legal recourse to monetary compensation for
harm resulting from the interference (and is thus a "liability rule"), id. The habeas
remedy, Morrison suggests, "is closer to a property rule than [to] a liability rule."
Morrison, supra note 5, at 439 n.150.
102 Morrison argues that his approach, like that ofJustice O'Connor (speaking for
a plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)), has the virtue of allowing congressional authorization and judicial review to coexist, thus preserving a role for all
three branches in a time of national crisis. Morrison, supra note 5, at 448-51. (Justice
O'Connor, in Hamdi, concluded that Congress's authorization of detention without
trial of U.S. citizens deemed to be enemy combatants did not preclude judicial inquiry into such basic constitutional issues as the adequacy of the processes used to
determine whether a detainee is in fact an enemy combatant. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
524-39 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion). Of course, as she noted, Congress had not
taken any action to suspend the habeas writ. Id. at 536-37.)
103 Morrison, supra note 5, at 432-33.
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One might view the existence (even if implied) of a constitutional
guarantee as suggesting that suspension of the writ should, if anything, result in less disruption to individual liberty than if the implied
guarantee were lacking. But I see the guarantee, when coupled with
the explicit power to suspend, as cutting quite differently-as supporting the conclusion that the presence of the specified justifications for
a valid suspension of the writ has more far-reaching consequences
under our law than did an analogous suspension in England by an
unfettered legislature.' 0 4 Moreover, though in theory other remedies
may have been available for "unlawful" detention on those occasions
when Parliament suspended the availability of the writ, I know of no
actual case in which a plaintiff was awarded such a remedy. 10 5
Second, Morrison's reliance on Milligan rests, in my view, on a
misunderstanding of the rationale of the majority and the disagreement of four Justices who concurred in the result. As Morrison notes,
the Court did not consider the merits of Milligan's claim in his habeas
petition until it determined that the Act suspending the writ did not
apply to his case. 10 6 It then went on to hold that Congress did not,
and constitutionally could not, authorize Milligan's trial by military
tribunal on the admitted facts of his case.10 7 That the disagreement of
four Justices with the majority went essentially to the latter point is
made clear in their opinion itself, which expressed the view that
"there are cases in which, the privilege of the writ being suspended,
trial and punishment by military commission, in states where civil
courts are open, may be authorized by Congress, as well as arrest and
detention." 0 8
Thus no Justice on the Court said or implied that, despite the Act
of suspension, detentions covered by its terms could be held unlawful.
104 As Morrison notes, discussion at the Constitutional Convention evidently did
not touch on the question whether a suspension would constitute affirmative authorization of detention that would otherwise be unlawful. Id. at 433 n.131. But the implications of that fact are surely limited. Compare the implications of the Convention's
relative silence on the question whether explicit authorization of suspension of the
writ constituted tacit recognition that absent the conditions requisite to suspension,
the privilege of the writ was affirmatively guaranteed as a matter of federal law. On
that question, see supra discussion Part I.D.
105 Interestingly, Collings states that when Parliament enacted a suspension of the
writ in England, causing the Habeas Corpus Act to cease to operate, the result was to
"allow[ I confinement without bail, indictment, or other judicial process." Collings,
supra note 6, at 340.
106 Morrison, supra note 5, at 431 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,

130-31 (1866)).
107
108

Id. (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 106-07, 130-31).
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137 (1866) (opinion of Chase, CJ.).
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The disagreement was whether there were circumstances in which a
valid suspension could be accompanied by a valid authorization to try
a detainee before a military commission. Yet Morrison's thesis, and
the conclusion with which I disagree, is that a valid suspension does
not render the detention itself beyond legal challenge.
In the only somewhat puzzling aspect of Milligan on this question, four Justices also express disagreement with the majority on the
issue of whether "when the writ is suspended, the Executive is authorized to arrest as well as to detain."10 9 (Note the implication in this
quote that suspension implies authority "to detain".) While detention
without trial is not only conceivable but was in fact condoned in the
particular circumstances presented in the important recent decision
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 1 1 it is hard to see how detention can occur without some form of physical seizure or arrest, unless the detainee voluntarily walks into custody. But a full reading of the lengthy Milligan
opinions reveals that the essential concern of both related to the question of trial, not to the arrest."1 I And in any event, no member of the
Court suggested that, if a valid Act of Congress suspending the writ
had been applicable in Milligan's case, the detention itself would have
been unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful.
Though I will develop the point more fully in the following section, Part II.C, a few words are appropriate here in response to Morrison's basic argument-that the writ is but a remedy, and the
unavailability of a remedy does not affect the existence of the underlying right.' 12 Of course, Morrison recognizes-in his analogy to the
powerful distinction between property rules and liability rules drawn
109 Id.
110 See 542 U.S. at 516-24 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). For a brief statement
of Justice O'Connor's conclusions in Hamdi, see supra note 102.
111 See, e.g., Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118 (stating that the "controlling question in the
case" was one of "jurisdiction"); id. at 132 (opinion of Chase, C.J.) (acknowledging
that the issue was one of jurisdiction).
112 In Hamdi, Justice Thomas, the only Justice addressing this issue, evidently
agreed with Morrison:
I do not see how suspension would make constitutional otherwise unconstitutional detentions ordered by the President. It simply removes a remedy.
Justice Scalia's position might therefore require one or both of the political
branches to act unconstitutionally in order to protect the Nation. But the
power to protect the Nation must be the power to do so lawfully.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 594 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Thomas uses this
point to argue in favor of inherent executive branch authority to detain independently of any implicit authorization accompanying a valid suspension of the writ, and
whether or not the conditions for suspension exist. Id. at 580-94. This is a position I
reject, and I'm sure Morrison does too.
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character of the right is proby Calabresi and Melamed-that the
1 3 But he does
available remedy.
foundly affected by the nature of the
later and fuller development
not consider Professor Daryl Levinson's
and remedy in his important article
of the relationship between right
Levinson argues that the relationon the subject written in 1999.114
"the cash value of a right is often
ship is in many ways so close that
(or some other institution with
nothing more than what the courts
Congress) will do if the right is
enforcement authority, for example,
to the extent
11 5 Though I do not fully endorse his thesis,
violated."
board, I bethe
distinction across
that it challenges the right-remedy
perintuitively
that has always been
lieve it highlights a relationship
In light of that relationship, the
ceived if not fully articulated.
interpretation of the Suspension
challenge is to arrive at the best
allows Congress to withdraw,
Clause, and the particular remedy it
of the Framers, the needs of the
from the standpoint of the purpose
the process of law that is due the
government in times of crisis, and
words, to what extent does the valid
individual in such times. In other
has been, the principal remsuspension of what is, and for centuries
affect the very definition of what
edy for a particular abuse of power
constitutes abuse?
Valid Suspension Is Not Unlawful
C. Detention Within the Scope of a
constitutional guarantee
As already noted, the case for an implicit
acremedy is a strong one, and one
of the availability of the habeas
as by the Supreme Court itself in
cepted by most commentators as well
for an im1
powerful dictum in St. Cyr.'

6

Is there also a strong case

under the Constitution or any other
plicit withdrawal of any objection,
of a detention pursuant to a
provision of our law, to the lawfulness
valid suspension of the habeas remedy?
the case is a convincing one. Its
I believe that there is, and that
understanding of those who
principal support lies in the natural
of the kinds of conditions likely to
framed the Suspension Clause and
exist when its use is warranted.
contemporary view of the writ
On the first of these grounds, the
against unlawful detention,
was not only as the first line of defense
supra note
438-39 (citing Calabresi & Melamed,
113 Morrison, supra note 5, at
101).
99 COLUM. L.
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
114 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
REV. 857 (1999).
115 Id. at 887.
notes
300-01 (2001); see supra text accompanying
116 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
41-43.
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but, I believe, more substantively, as the means by which individual
freedom from arbitrary detention was to be guaranteed. Blackstone's
emphasis on the link between the substantive commitments of compliance with law in the Magna Carta and the remedy supplied by the
Great Writ1 17 is hard to exaggerate.' 1 8 As he said in the introduction
to an extended discussion, the function of "the most celebrated writ in
the English law"' 19 is to require that a reason be given for every commitment, so that "the court upon a habeas corpus may examine into its
validity; and according to the circumstances of the case may discharge,
admit to bail, or remand" the prisoner. 120 Moreover, he noted, on
those occasions when evasion of the writ threatened its critical role,
12
the legislature had acted to restore the balance. '
Thus it seems more than likely that contemporary thinking
tended to equate the right to be free from unlawful detention with the
role of habeas corpus in guaranteeing that right. And this belief is
buttressed by the nature of the debate over the appropriate language
to use in the Constitution-a debate that focused primarily on
whether or not any exceptions to the availability of the writ should be
recognized.1 22 The intensity of this debate makes far less sense if the
availability of the writ and the lawfulness of the detention were not
regarded as two sides of the same coin.
The history of suspension by federal legislative act supports this
understanding. Such legislation has been rare and has been essentially confined to those circumstances in which the dangers of chaos
and lawlessness were so great as to warrant emergency measures tantamount to martial law. 123 The notions that detentions under such cir117
118

supra note 11, at *133-34.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
119 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *129.
120 Id. at *134 (emphasis omitted). To be sure, Blackstone also referred quite
briefly to several alternatives as remedies for "false imprisonment." See id. at *128,
*138. But each of the three rather archaic writs referred to (writs of "mainprize,"
"odio et atia," and "de homine replegiando") was of extremely limited value. See id. at
*128-29. And in his one paragraph (one sentence) discussion of an action in trespass
for damages resulting from false imprisonment, id. at *138, he makes no reference to
detention pursuant to the order of a government official, or to the question of when
such detention may lead to liability in damages.
121 Id. at *134-38.
122 See DUKER, supra note 2, at 128-31 (noting that one point of concern expressed at the Convention with respect to the Suspension Clause-perhaps the principal point-was that since the powerto suspend already existed in the states (or most
of them), it was unnecessary and dangerous to give that power to Congress as well).
123 Congress has authorized suspension infrequently-during the Civil War (after
the President's unilateral suspension of the writ); during Reconstruction; in the Philippines in the early twentieth century in the event of "rebellion, insurrection, or invaBLACISTONE,
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cumstances might be subject to other remedies, either
contemporaneous or ex post, and that (as Morrison argues) the executive might be restrained from ordering a detention he deems necessary to preserve or restore order by the threat of such sanctions-or
even by the moral force of his oath to support the Constitution and
laws'

24

-simply

cannot be reconciled with the underlying premise of

the legislative decision. In this very practical sense then, remedy and
right become not just interdependent but inseparable.
Interestingly, Morrison appears to recognize this point in a footnote discussing the possibility of obtaining an injunctive decree ordering release during a period of valid suspension.12 5 In rejecting this
possibility, he simply notes that under existing doctrine, an injunction
may not be an available remedy for state prisoners, that it is in any
event a remedy that may be denied in the "sound discretion" of the
trial judge, and that Congress could seal any loophole by prohibiting
its use as an alternative to the writ in instances in which the writ has
been suspended. 126 Nowhere does he consider the question
whether-accepting his assumption that the detention may be unconstitutional even though the writ has been suspended-the Constitu1 27
tion itself may require that some meaningful remedy be available.
Moreover, Morrison's first reason for questioning the availability
of injunctive relief cuts deeper than he appears to recognize. In a line
of cases beginning with Preiserv. Rodriguez,12 8 the Court has held that
the existence of the habeas corpus remedy for one in custody pursuant to a state conviction bars resort not only to the alternative of insion" (a power exercised by the governor in 1905 with respect to a particular
province, during a period of insurrection in that province); and in Hawaii under the
Organic Act of 1900, when required by the "public safety" (a power exercised by the
governor after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941). See Ekeland, supra note 48, at
1487 & nn.83-87.
For a full discussion of one compelling example of the need for such authorization and the use of delegated authority, see Lou Falkner Williams, The Constitution and
the Ku Klux Klan on Trial. Federal Enforcement and Local Resistance in South Carolina,
1871-1872, 2 GA.J. S. LEGAL HIsT. 41 (1993), describing the virtual overrunning of
South Carolina by the Ku Klux Klan after the Civil War and the resulting mass arrests
and detentions by government forces, acting pursuant to legislatively authorized suspension of the writ under the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14.
124 Morrison, supra note 5, at 435-36.
125 Id. at 433 n.134.
126 Id.
127 For discussion of the complex issues presented by the questions of whether,
when, and to what extent the Constitution itself may mandate the availability of at
least one meaningful remedy for invasion, or threatened invasion, of a constitutional
right, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 795-804, 823-25.
128 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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but also to a civil rights action for
junctive relief in a civil rights action
require
in either case would in effect
damages where the judgment
2 9 By
the commitment rests.
invalidation of the conviction on which
that a habeas applicant must surimplication, if the rigorous hurdles
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mount operate to bar that habeas
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hurdles cannot be circumvented
a
in
point
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3 0 To be sure, this line of cases is not directly
relief. 1
detention
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Congress
If
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tion. But the cases are surely
of
denial
circumstances warrant
made a valid decision that extreme
be
detained, should the detainee
the classic remedy for one officially
that
by resorting to another remedy
able to circumvent that decision
to withdraw? (Or if some meaningCongress has inadvertently failed
one
for violations of individual rights,
ful remedy must be available
that
Or is the sounder conclusion
that Congress could not withdraw?)
this classic remedy unavailable-by
the legislature's decision to make
ExecuSuspension Clause-frees the
exercising its power under the
otherwise
would
on detention that
tive from the legal restraints
apply?131
512
of the later cases is Heck v. Humphrey,
129 Id. at 489-91. The most significant
U.S. 477 (1994).
must surmount
hurdles that a habeas petitioner
130 Among the most important
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grasp. But if the debate is understood as involving the ability to detain
free from any judicial oversight during times of crisis, its importance is
more readily understood.
Second, the judicial role in overseeing acts of suspension has already been recognized in several cases, most notably Ex parte Milligan,135 where the Court concluded that Milligan himself was not
within the scope of the legislative provision for suspension of the
writ . 3 6 Moreover, as advocated here and more forcefully by others,
the very validity of a suspension-with respect to both the predicate
conditions and the duration and other terms of the suspensionshould be subject to judicial review, though the standard of review is
far from certain. 137 These aspects of judicial supervision serve to limit
the impact on individual liberty of a valid suspension and help to ensure that conditions really do warrant the authority that a suspension
vests in the executive branch.
Finally, and perhaps most important, acceptance of the argument
made here should not be understood to mean more than this: if the
detaining authority is acting pursuant to a valid legislative suspension
of the writ, only the detention itself-and actions (such as seizure of
the person) that are strictly necessary to effectuate it-are immunized
from the restraints that would otherwise apply under the governing
law. Thus the invocation of remedies other than habeas corpus would
be available, for example, in connection with a claim for maltreatment
in violation of law, treaty, or the Constitution;13 as a means of
preventing trial by a tribunal not duly authorized by law to adjudicate
135 71 U.S. (4 Wall,) 2 (1866).
136 Id at 130-31.
137 See supra Part I.E,
138 Claims of improper treatment during detention might range from allegations
of physical abuse to denial of access to counsel, and the validity of any such claims
would depend on factors independent of the authority conferred by legislation pursuant to the Suspension Clause. For example, a prisoner might complain (if in state
detention, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or if in federal detention, under Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), and/or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.. 388 (1971))
of treatment allegedly in violation of the Eighth Amendment. If successful, he might
be entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the treatment, or to damages for the harm caused by it, but not to release from detention.
Moreover, in circumstances akin to those described by Kontorovich, where courts
were inundated with complaints of maltreatment in connection with mass detentions

resulting from a national emergency, the courts, with or without legislative authorization, and quite apart from the suspension of the habeas writ, might properly choose
to restrict the remedies available to ex post relief (e.g., a Bivens damages remedy).
Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 781-82.
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detention and a challenge to maltreatment that, if successful, does not
result in discharge of the prisoner. Nor, in my view, is there any conflict between the writ's unavailability and an action to prevent a trial,
or to attack a conviction-so long as the success of the action does not
require termination of the detention. (Of course, success of the action may persuade the authorities to terminate the detention, but if
they conclude that detention is still warranted pursuant to a valid suspension of the writ, no present or ex post remedy would be available,
and indeed, no law would be violated.)
The remedial-substantive link, in sum, does not mean that the
function of the writ is to protect all elements of the due process guarantee, either as that guarantee was originally envisioned or as it has
evolved over the centuries. Rather, in both its inception and its development (though recent years have seen some significant expansion),
the writ was understood as the method of challenging the lawfulness
of detention.14 2 Thus, in my view, it was that particular aspect, and only
that aspect, of due process that the Founders were willing to allow
Congress to abridge during times of crisis.
True, the possibility remains that Congress, in an effort to cut off
judicial consideration of other claims of unlawful conduct, might also
enact legislation-perhaps in the form ofjurisdiction-stripping-seeking to bar such claims from being brought to any court in any form.
But any such legislation would raise difficult questions alluded to earlier' 43 and would receive little or no support from the authority of
Congress to suspend the writ.
Three testing cases may help to illustrate both the core and the
limitations of my argument. First, the decision to intern JapaneseAmericans during World War II-perhaps one of the most criticized
by a challenge to the jurisdiction of a tribunal set up to adjudicate a criminal charge
against the detainee.)
142 The significance of detention (or imprisonment or custody) as both the basis
of jurisdiction and the question at issue on a petition for habeas corpus has been
stressed throughout this Article. It is evident not only in the jurisdictional requirement that the petitioner be in custody but in the analysis of the writ in the writings of
Blackstone, see supra note 120, and other jurists and commentators, see, for example,
Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad FederalHabeas Corpus Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1079, 1087 (1995) (describing the writ as requiring a
showing of "sufficient legal cause for detaining or jailing"), as well as in manyjudicial
opinions, see, for example, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963) (referring to the
jurisdictional prerequisite for habeas as "detention simpliciter'); In re Medley, 134 U.S.
160, 173 (1890) (noting that traditionally, habeas corpus is a remedy only for wrongful commitment and that the traditional form of relief has therefore been discharge

from prison).
143

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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events in our history-would almost certainly gain no support from
my argument. 144 Not only was there no legislation that could be read
as suspending the writ in that context, 145 but had there been, it might
well have been vulnerable to challenge on the ground that, although
we were at war, there was no "rebellion" or "invasion" warranting suspension of the writ on our own West Coast. (Even if the attack on,
and occupation of, American soil thousands of miles from California
constituted an "invasion," the distance from California and the enormous sweep of the dragnet, based solely on ethnicity, might well have
been regarded as an abuse of the discretion conferred by the "public
safety" provision of the Suspension Clause.) The "relocation," in
other words, highlights the kind of emergency that must be present to
warrant invocation of this emergency power.
Milligan's case is a second example. Though Indiana itself was
not part of the Confederacy, there clearly was a "rebellion," and the
rebelling states were not far away.' 4 6 Thus it is distinctly possible that
had Congress suspended the writ in terms applicable to Milligan, the
suspension would have withstood judicial review. But, as suggested
above, that would not have barred Milligan from bringing an appropriate action (for a writ of prohibition or mandamus) to prevent his
trial by a military commission.' 4 7 Had Milligan succeeded, no trial
could have occurred, but the Executive would still have had authority
to detain him, so long as the detention continued to fall within the
terms of a valid Act suspending the writ.
Finally, take a case like Hamdi's. 14 8 If we assume that the present
crisis warrants a legislative decision to suspend the writ, 149 and that
144 Of the three significant Japanese-American interment cases in the Supreme
Court, two (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945), and Hirabyashiv. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)) arose on direct review, and affirmed the petitioners' criminal convictions. Only the third, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), discussed infra
note 145, involved a habeas corpus petition.

There have been many studies of the internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II. For one of particular contemporary interest, because of its effort to
relate that experience to the current internment of persons deemed to be enemy

combatants, see Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment's
Shadow, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2005, at 255, at 264-78.
145 In Ex parte Endo, the Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas corpus should
be granted to the petitioner, a loyal citizen ofJapanese descent who was being held in

a relocation center. Endo, 323 U.S. at 305-06. No argument was made by the Government in this case that there was any applicable Act of Congress suspending the writ.
146 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 140 (1866).
147 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
148
149

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see supra note 102.
As advocated in Ekeland, supra note 48, at 1517-19.
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Congress were to enact such legislation, the question whether
Hamdi's detention came within the terms of the legislation would still
be open to judicial challenge (for example, the Act might well be limited to "enemy combatants"), as would such questions as the nature of
his treatment and the authority of a particular tribunal to adjudicate
any charges against him.1 50
CONCLUSION

Accommodation between the demands of national security and
those of the individual to be free from abusive interference, especially
with his physical liberty, is never easy. And for one who is loath to
sacrifice the latter under any circumstances, the task is particularly
agonizing. But the resolution suggested here is, I believe, the most
consistent with the text, purpose, and understanding of the Suspension Clause; with the emergencies that warrant its use; and with the
individual interests that require protection, even in the midst of a national crisis.

150 If, as is likely, any Act suspending the writ would be limited to enemy combatants, or persons meeting a similar description, a court on a habeas petition would be
entitled to consider the question of the detainee's status in order to determine
whether the Act applied under its own terms. This approximates the actual result in
the case.
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